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Abstract
We experimentally manipulate agents' information regarding the rationality of others in a set-
ting in which previous studies have found irrationality to be present, namely the asset market
experiments introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (Econometrica, 1988). Recent stud-
ies suggest that mispricing in such markets may be an artefact of confusion, which can be
reduced by training subjects to understand the diminishing fundamental value. We reconsider
this view, and argue that when it is made public knowledge that training has occurred, this
may also reduce uncertainty over the behavior of others and facilitate the formation of common
expectations. Our design disentangles the direct eﬀect of training from the indirect eﬀect of its
public knowledge, and our results indicate a distinct eﬀect of public knowledge over and above
that of training alone.
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In a wide range of decision problems, the optimal course of action depends critically on agents'
expectations regarding the behavior  and therefore implicitly the rationality  of others. This is
the case not only in many applied problems of business strategy, but also in the corpus of theory
that economists have developed to model such interactions. As is well known, standard solution
concepts such as rationalizability and backward induction demand high levels of mutual knowledge
of rationality, resulting in stark equilibrium predictions that frequently fail in the experimental
laboratory (Nagel, 1995; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992). Yet, what is less commonly acknowledged
is that these settings arguably also stretch the limits of the experimental method itself. For while
an experimenter can control such features as the set of players, the strategies at their disposal
and resultant material payoﬀs, it is far more diﬃcult for the experimenter to credibly control the
epistemic conditions that are also required for equilibrium predictions to obtain  in particular
the beliefs that players hold regarding the rationality of their counterparts. Nonetheless, when
experimental ﬁndings fail to conﬁrm equilibrium predictions, it is tempting to conclude that this
might reﬂect some failure of rationality itself rather than the common knowledge thereof.
In this paper, we reconsider these issues in the context of the mispricing observed in the asset market
experiments introduced by Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988, hereinafter SSW). In particular,
we reexamine the recent suggestion that this mispricing is due to confusion, and can be ameliorated
by training subjects to understand fundamental value (FV). We reassert the importance of subjects'
expectations, by proposing that the coordination of expectations may also be facilitated when it is
made public knowledge that such training has taken place. To test this conjecture, we manipulate
whether or not it is public knowledge that all traders in a market have undergone training. We can
thus distinguish the direct eﬀect of training from the indirect eﬀect of its public knowledge, and we
ﬁnd that there is a distinct eﬀect of public knowledge in addition to that of training itself.
The phenomenon of price bubbles and crashes in SSW-style asset market experiments was for
many years considered a paradox or anomaly. Over the quarter century that followed publication of
SSW, a large body of research sought to identify and eliminate the sources of this mispricing, with
only limited success.1 SSW's original interpretation of their discovery was that diﬀerences between
1King, Smith, Williams, and van Boening (1993), van Boening, Williams, and LaMaster (1993), Porter and Smith
(1995), and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) manipulate aspects of the rules of the institutions that govern exchange.
Porter and Smith (1995), Smith, van Boening, and Wellford (2000), Noussair, Robin, and Ruﬃeux (2001), and
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price and FV may be due to a lack of common, not irrational, expectations (p. 1120), and that
it is the failure of the assumption of common expectations, not backward induction incompetence
by subject agents that explains bubbles (p. 1148, emphasis added). That is, although the dividend
structure of the asset was made public knowledge by the experimenter, each subject might still have
been uncertain as to how others would use that information. However, in SSW's interpretation, it
was not necessary that subjects actually failed to comprehend the information itself.
More recently, a new interpretation has proposed that mispricing in SSWmarkets is largely a product
of confusion over the FV process, which declines over time due to the ﬁnite life of the dividend-
paying experimental asset (and may thus be inconsistent with subjects' homegrown expectations
derived from real-world assets). Consistent with this view, several recent studies ﬁnd that when
care is taken to train subjects to correctly understand declining FV, mispricing in SSW markets
is substantially diminished.2 Huber and Kirchler (2012, p. 89) summarize these results by stating
that all bubble reducing factors have one common feature: they allow subjects to understand the
non-intuitive declining FV-process of the SSW-model better and thus reduce subjects' confusion.3
The ﬁrst conclusive evidence of confusion was provided by Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001, here-
inafter LNP). They made explicit the implication of SSW's conjecture that mispricing arises from
uncertainty over the behavior of others  namely that some subjects must doubt the rationality of
others, and thus perceive an opportunity for speculation. To test this, LNP designed treatments
in which speculation was not possible (by prohibiting subjects in the role of buyers from reselling,
and subjects in the role of sellers from repurchasing), and nonetheless observed many transactions
Hussam, Porter, and Smith (2008) manipulate aspects of the dividend process of the experimental asset. James and
Isaac (2000) study the eﬀect of incentives; Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005) study the eﬀect of experience;
Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007) elicit subjects' price predictions; and Cheung and Palan (2012) study the eﬀect
of group decision-making. Recent surveys of this literature include Porter and Smith (2008), and Palan (2013).
2Noussair and Tucker (2006) sequentially open a complete set of futures markets, in reverse order of maturity,
prior to opening the spot market; they state explicitly that this is intended to facilitate backward-induction reasoning
over the FV. Lei and Vesely (2009) introduce a pre-market phase in which subjects passively experience a ﬂow of
dividends. After this they ask subjects to state, for each period, the value of an asset that pays dividends in every
remaining period of its life. Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012) introduce a new framing (stocks of a depletable gold
mine) intended to call to mind a declining FV. Huber and Kirchler (2012) present FV information in a graph instead
of a table, and ask subjects to state their estimate of the FV before the start of each period. Each of these protocols
is found to produce patterns of mispricing that are less pronounced than is typical in SSW-style markets.
3Thus, for example, the well-known result that mispricing in SSW markets is diminished with repetition  which
SSW interpreted to show that subjects came to form common expectations by learning the behavior of others through
experience  is reinterpreted to indicate that subjects were instead learning to understand FV. It follows that an
appropriate training protocol could serve as a substitute for such experience (Lei and Vesely 2009, p. 258).
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at prices that were as a consequence certain to be unproﬁtable. From this, LNP were careful to
conclude that the lack of common knowledge of the rationality of market participants . . . can be
ruled out as being the only cause of the bubble phenomenon (p. 834, emphasis in original).4
In this paper, we reaﬃrm the role of common expectations, as ﬁrst emphasized by SSW, in the wake
of the ﬁnding of confusion in SSW markets. Since LNP establish that doubts over the behavior of
others are well-founded, it follows that protocols that facilitate common expectations cannot wholly
substitute for ones that address the underlying confusion. However, it does not follow that the two
may not be complements. Nonetheless, we submit that all recent training protocols in fact share a
second common feature  namely the fact that it is public knowledge that all subjects in the market
have been jointly exposed to the protocol.
We suggest that in making the training of declining FV public knowledge, these recent studies may
also have the eﬀect of reducing uncertainty over the behavior of others and resolving the problem
of coordinating subjects' price expectations  and that this may in itself have contributed to the
ﬁnding of diminished mispricing.5 To evaluate this conjecture, we report new experiments in which
we manipulate both whether or not subjects are trained to understand FV, and whether or not it
is public knowledge that all subjects in the market have undergone this training.6 Through this
design, we are able to disentangle the direct eﬀect of training in reducing confusion from the indirect
eﬀect of its public knowledge in facilitating common expectations.
Our results replicate the ﬁnding of previous studies that ﬁnd that when all subjects are trained to
understand diminishing FV, and this is made public knowledge, mispricing is signiﬁcantly less than
when training has not occurred. We introduce a new treatment in which all subjects in the market
have been trained, but this is not public knowledge, and ﬁnd that this results in an intermediate
4Smith (2010, p. 6) acknowledges that SSW's original interpretation of their ﬁnding was falsiﬁed by the LNP
result; however he does not wholeheartedly endorse the notion that the subjects were confused.
5Noussair and Tucker (2006, p. 169) acknowledge that their futures market protocol cannot discriminate between
the eﬀects of coordinating expectations and reducing confusion. Lei and Vesely (2009, p. 256) are less circumspect,
asserting that individual rationality induced in the pre-market phase was so profound that uncertainty about the
behaviour of others . . . never became strong enough to divert market prices away from the fundamental values. This
overlooks the possibility that behavioral uncertainty might itself have been diminished as a byproduct of the protocol.
6We speak of public knowledge of training to make clear that we do not claim that this suﬃces to establish common
knowledge of rationality. This is because the formal concept of common knowledge involves higher-order beliefs, about
which we have no direct evidence. Nonetheless, since LNP establish the presence of actual irrationality in the absence
of training, we assert that common knowledge of rationality is impossible when i) confusion has been reduced through
training, however ii) this is not public knowledge.
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level of mispricing. We interpret this to indicate that there is a distinct eﬀect of public knowledge
over and above that of training alone, and we submit that this possibility may have been neglected
in the recent literature on confusion.7
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines our design, including details of our training
and public knowledge manipulations. Section 2 presents our results, and Section 3 concludes.
1 Design
1.1 Market environment
In each market, ten subjects trade shares of a dividend-paying asset in exchange for experimental
currency units (ECU) in a computerized double auction over ﬁfteen four-minute trading periods.
The distribution of initial endowments is summarized in Appendix A; valued at FV, each subject
has the same initial wealth. After each period, each share pays a common dividend which, following
SSW's classic Design 4 parameters, takes values of 0, 8, 28, or 60 ECU, each with equal probability.
After the ﬁfteenth period, shares expire without any terminal value. The FV of a share is thus given
by the product of its expected dividend per period (24 ECU) and the number of dividends remaining.
In particular, the FV is 360 in period one, and declines by 24 in each subsequent period. We follow
standard practice in the SSW literature by making FV information public knowledge in the form
of an average holding value table which is contained within the instructions.
1.2 Training protocol
Our protocol to train subjects in the FV process consists of two sets of control questions  one
framed from the perspective of buying a share, and the other framed from the perspective of selling.
We include ﬁfteen questions in each frame, ordered from period ﬁfteen to period one. In the buyer
frame subjects were asked, for t = {15, 14, . . . , 1}:
7We do not contest the view, also advanced in the recent literature, that the SSW design has some unusual features
that may lack external validity (Oechssler 2010, Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl 2012). In addition to declining FV, these
include a ﬁnite horizon, increasing cash-to-asset ratio, and high dividend yields.
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Suppose that you buy one share in period t and that you keep it until the end of the
market (i.e. until period 15). What is the average total dividend that you will receive
from this share?
Similarly, in the seller frame subjects were asked, for t = {15, 14, . . . , 1}:
Suppose that you sell one share in period t and that you do not buy it back. What is
the average total dividend that you give up on this share?
We require subjects to answer both sets of questions, thereby eﬀectively requiring them to enter the
FV values from the average holding value table twice, from the bottom up. In each of the sessions
in which subjects were required to answer these questions, the experiment did not commence until
all of the subjects who were required to do so had answered all of the questions correctly.8
Prior to constructing these control questions, we conducted a thorough search of the literature for
appropriate precedents, and identiﬁed very few. Given that control questions are typically only
included in working papers and do not ﬁnd their way into ﬁnal publications, we do not claim that
they are seldom used, but it would appear that their use is not universal. Moreover, many of the
examples we identiﬁed relate to features of the market institution that are novel to a speciﬁc paper,
for example, the futures markets of Noussair and Tucker (2006), as opposed to the standard SSW
environment itself. In short, the existing literature provides little clear guidance as to what to
include in an appropriate set of control questions.
Since the purpose of our training protocol was to redress confusion over the declining value of shares,
our control questions naturally place a heavy emphasis on checking subjects' understanding of the
FV process.9 Because of this, we acknowledge that our results would not necessarily be invariant
to the content of the control questions, and in particular we do not claim that our results would
hold under some other protocol that did not stress FV in this way. For example, one of the referees
8Unfortunately, we do not have data on subjects' performance in answering the control questions as we did not
record the number of attempts or the time individual subjects needed to successfully answer them.
9In fact, by presenting the questions in reverse order from period ﬁfteen to period one our protocol was actually
intended to highlight the backward induction of FV, as opposed to its declining value per se. In this respect, it was
modeled upon the futures market protocol of Noussair and Tucker (2006).
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suggests that our buyer control questions might draw subjects' attention to a buy-and-hold strategy.
One could equally well conceive of an alternative set of questions that might highlight the possibility
of a speculative strategy, and we would certainly not expect this to yield the same results. However,
such a set of questions would not serve our original purpose of reducing confusion over FV.
At the time that we developed our procedure, we were unaware of several of the more recent training
protocols described in footnote 2. Nonetheless, we consider the various procedures to be comparable,
in that they all seek to reinforce subjects' understanding of the FV information in the instructions.
1.3 Treatments
We operated two markets in each session, for a total of twenty subjects. Our design consists of
four treatments, which diﬀer in whether or not subjects were required to complete the training
task before the experiment could begin, and whether or not this was public knowledge. In the two
treatments in which subjects answered control questions, it was always the case that all ten subjects
in a market were required to do so; these treatments therefore diﬀer only in whether or not this was
public knowledge. We collected a total of six observations (markets) in each treatment. We thus
have the same number of markets in each treatment as the recent papers by Kirchler, Huber and
Stöckl (2012) and Huber and Kirchler (2012), and a larger number than the seminal paper by LNP.
In the Public Knowledge (PK) treatment, all subjects were required to successfully complete the
training task, and this was public knowledge. Subjects were informed that the experiment would
not begin until all twenty subjects in the session had correctly answered all of the questions.
To obtain the treatments we refer to as NPK and WAIT, we informed all twenty subjects in a session
that some of them would be asked to answer some control questions, and that those subjects would
have to answer all of the questions correctly before the experiment could begin. The remaining
subjects would not be asked any questions, and would simply wait for the experiment to begin.
Of the twenty subjects in these sessions, we required ten to answer the full set of questions. Through
a message on their computer screens, we informed these subjects that exactly ten of the subjects
in the session would be required to answer the questions. What they were not told is that all ten
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would be grouped together to trade in the same market. This market thus consisted of ten subjects
who had all completed the training task successfully but who did not know that all others in the
market had also done so. We refer to this treatment as Not Public Knowledge (NPK).
As a byproduct of NPK we also had ten subjects in these sessions who did not complete the training
task and were simply required to wait for the others to ﬁnish. These ten subjects were grouped
together to make up the second market in the session. Through a message on their computer screens,
we informed these subjects that when the experiment began, none of the subjects in their market
would have answered any questions.10 We refer to this treatment as WAIT.
Finally, in our BASE treatment none of the subjects in the session were required to complete the
training task, and they did not have to wait for others to do so before the experiment could begin.
Thus, to reiterate the key feature of our design: In both treatments PK and NPK, all subjects in the
market were trained to understand the declining FV process by requiring them to correctly answer
the control questions; however only in treatment PK was this made public knowledge.
1.4 Procedures
We conducted our experiments at the University of Copenhagen between October 2009 and June
2010. No subject had taken part in any previous asset market experiment. We recruited subjects
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004), and the experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
At the start of each session, we distributed and read aloud the ﬁrst part of the instructions dealing
with the mechanics of using the computer interface to make price oﬀers and to buy and sell shares.11
This was followed by a ten-minute practice period, which did not count toward subjects' earnings.
To minimize any anchoring eﬀect of the practice prices, subjects completed the practice task before
being told the dividend structure of the asset or how their earnings would be determined.
We next circulated and read aloud the remainder of the instructions, dealing with the dividends,
10We did this to control these subjects' expectations with respect to the training history of their counterparts, and
thereby enable us to test for the pure eﬀect of waiting time in WAIT compared to BASE.
11See the Online Appendix for the full instructions, which also include a screen shot of the double auction interface.
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average holding value table and calculation of earnings. Following this, some subjects were required
to complete the training task as appropriate to the treatment (as detailed above).
Upon conclusion of the experiment, subjects completed a questionnaire consisting of some basic
demographic items, the three-item Cognitive Reﬂection Test (Frederick 2005), and a ten-item test
of ﬁnancial literacy derived from van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). Sessions lasted up to 2.5
hours, and the average earnings were DKK 239 (approximately USD 48 as of November 2009).
1.5 Hypotheses
Our design allows us to tease apart the eﬀects of requiring subjects to wait before the experiment
can begin (under treatment WAIT), of requiring all subjects in the market to successfully complete
the training protocol when this is not public knowledge (under treatment NPK), and of making
it public knowledge that all subjects successfully completed the training (under treatment PK).
The existing literature indicates that there is likely to be substantial mispricing under BASE, and
considerably less under PK. By examining the decomposition of this diﬀerence, as seen through the
intermediate treatments WAIT and NPK, we expect to be able to shed light upon the mechanism
through which training results in diminished mispricing.
Our ﬁrst testable hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of requiring our WAIT subjects to wait for others
to complete the training task before the experiment can begin. It is possible that simply giving
these subjects more time in which to think through the information in the instructions might itself
reduce mispricing, even in the absence of any training. We formulate this hypothesis in light of the
evidence for a positive eﬀect of time to think on decision quality, as documented in, e.g.Kocher and
Sutter (2006) or Russo and Shoemaker (1990).
Hypothesis 1: Mispricing is less severe under WAIT compared to BASE.
Our second hypothesis states that we expect to replicate the recent ﬁnding that mispricing is reduced
when all subjects have been trained to understand FV, and this fact is made public knowledge.
Hypothesis 2: Mispricing is less severe under PK compared to WAIT and BASE.
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Table 1: Measures of mispricing and overvaluation
Measure Deﬁnition
Relative Absolute Deviation RAD = 1T
∑
t
∣∣P¯t − ft∣∣ / ∣∣f¯ ∣∣
Relative Deviation RD = 1T
∑
t
(
P¯t − ft
)
/
∣∣f¯ ∣∣
Note: T = total number of trading periods; P¯t = mean transaction price in period t; ft = fundamental value
in period t; f¯ = mean fundamental value over the life of the asset.
Our next two hypotheses are concerned with disentangling the eﬀect of training from that of its
public knowledge. Insofar as there is a direct eﬀect of training per se, we would expect this to be
observed when it is not public knowledge that all subjects successfully completed the training.
Hypothesis 3: Mispricing is less severe under NPK compared to WAIT and BASE.
On the other hand, insofar as there is an indirect eﬀect of public knowledge, this would only be
evident in the PK treatment and not in NPK. This motivates our ﬁnal hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Mispricing is less severe under PK compared to NPK.
1.6 Measures of mispricing and overvaluation
We follow the recent literature in reporting the measures of Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD) for
mispricing, and Relative Deviation (RD) for overvaluation, as introduced by Stöckl, Huber, and
Kirchler (2010). The formal deﬁnitions of these measures are stated in Table 1, while Appendix
Table B2 reports values of these measures for each of our markets.12 RAD measures the average
absolute deviation of price from FV, and may thus be interpreted as a measure of the overall severity
of mispricing without regard for sign. On the other hand, RD measures the average direction of
price deviations, permitting periods of over and undervaluation to cancel out.
Since we express our hypotheses in terms of mispricing, our preferred measure is RAD: if the eﬀect
12In addition, we follow Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012) in also reporting a variety of other measures from the
earlier SSW literature. These additional measures are deﬁned and reported in Appendix Table B1, and their values
are also reported in Appendix Table B2.
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of our treatments were to reduce the incidence of both over and undervaluation, this would be
clearly evident in the form of a lower RAD, but the same would not necessarily be true of RD.
2 Results
Figure 1 provides an overview of the period-wise median price trajectories in each of the individual
markets (gray lines) together with the corresponding treatment means (thick black lines), with each
treatment depicted in a separate panel.13 For comparison, the lower stepped line depicts the time
path of FV while the upper, dashed, stepped line represents the maximum dividend value of a share
(in the event that the maximum dividend of 60 is realized in every remaining period).
Looking ﬁrstly at the thick black line that represents the treatment mean, while it is evident that
this tracks most closely to FV under treatment PK, it is also clear that it does not diﬀer all that
greatly across the four treatments. As is usual, it is the case on average in each treatment that prices
tend to be moderately undervalued in the early periods and somewhat overvalued in the middle
to later periods. This provides a ﬁrst indication that there do not appear to be strong diﬀerences
between the treatments in terms of average overvaluation.
However, turning to the gray lines that depict the price paths in individual markets, it is equally
evident that there are clear diﬀerences between treatments in the degree of dispersion of the indi-
vidual market trajectories around the treatment means. In particular, in some of the treatments
in which average overvaluation is mild, this only holds because we observe both some markets that
exhibit pronounced overvaluation and others that are characterized by dramatic undervaluation 
and these cancel out in computing the treatment means. That is to say, we do indeed observe
substantial total mispricing, and moreover this indeed appears to vary across the treatments.
In particular, it is clear that the price paths of the individual markets typically track FV more
closely in the PK treatment than under either WAIT or BASE. Interestingly, however, it is less
obvious that this is the case in the NPK treatment. This suggests that simply training subjects to
13In the PK treatment, we have partial data for a seventh market in which we experienced a fatal server crash after
the end of the twelfth period. The available data from this market are shown in Figure 1 as a dashed gray line. We
do not include this market in our main analysis of the RAD and RD measures below.
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Figure 1: Median price trajectories in individual markets
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Note: This ﬁgure shows the period-wise median transaction price trajectories in each of the six individual
markets in each of our four treatments. (In the PK treatment, the gray dashed line shows partial data for
a seventh market in which we experienced a fatal server crash after the end of the twelfth period.) In each
panel, the thick black line represents the treatment mean, while the lower solid stepped line represents the
time path of FV and the upper dashed stepped line represents the maximum dividend value of a share.
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understand FV, without making this public knowledge, may not diminish mispricing as eﬀectively
as when it is also made public knowledge that all subjects have completed the training.
To formalize these observations, Table 2 reports an analysis of the measures RAD (for mispricing)
and RD (for overvaluation). The top panel reports means of these measures for each of our four
treatments. For example, in treatment PK the mean RAD of 0.182 indicates that prices in these
markets deviate from FV in absolute terms by an average of 18.2%, while the mean RD of =0.028
indicates that the markets are on average undervalued by 2.8%. The treatment means of RAD are
ranked in the expected order, with the greatest mispricing observed in BASE followed by WAIT
and then NPK, and the lowest value observed under PK. The mispricing under PK is roughly half
of that observed in BASE and WAIT. The mean overvaluation is clearly closest to zero in the PK
treatment; there is no obvious interpretation for the ranking of RD across the remaining treatments,
which display tendencies toward both over and undervaluation.14, 15
In the lower panel of Table 2, we report results of formal tests of our four hypotheses using the
Fisher-Pitman exact permutation test for independent samples. This is a more powerful but com-
putationally demanding alternative to the Mann-Whitney U test (Kaiser 2007). Since we state our
hypotheses in one-sided terms, we report corresponding one-sided p-values. Our preferred measure
is the RAD, because we state our hypotheses in terms of mispricing, and because we believe that
this measure more accurately accounts for the possibility that our treatments might reduce the
incidence of both over and undervaluation. Nonetheless, we also report corresponding tests for RD
in the second column.16 In Appendix Table C1 we report the corresponding one-sided p-values for
some alternative statistical tests. In both Mann-Whitney U tests and in two-sample t-tests (with
14The PK treatment also exhibits the lowest (absolute) mean for each of the additional measures in Appendix Table
B2, with the exception of Share Turnover. Smith, van Boening, and Wellford (2000, p. 577) note that when prices
are close to FV, as is the case under PK, a high level of turnover may indicate that the market is highly competitive.
15As a robustness check of our results, we also examined the inﬂuence of individual subject characteristics. In OLS
regressions of the RAD and RD measures on questionnaire items (with standard errors clustered by markets), we
ﬁnd a positive association between RAD and the proportion of postgraduate subjects in the market, while there are
no signiﬁcant eﬀects in a regression of RD. In a regression of subjects' earnings, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
of subjects' Cognitive Reﬂection Test and ﬁnancial literacy scores, and a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient on a dummy
for females. We also compared the subject composition of our treatments in terms of their observable characteristics.
In pairwise comparisons between treatments, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerences are that there are fewer females in PK
and NPK compared to BASE, subjects in PK have lower ﬁnancial literacy than those in NPK and WAIT, and that
there are fewer postgraduate students in WAIT than BASE. We do not think it plausible that these diﬀerences would
account for our results.
16The p-values in the second column of Table 2 thus correspond to tests of hypotheses, analogous to the ones stated
in Section 1.5, in which the words Mispricing is less severe are replaced by the words Overvaluation is lower.
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Table 2: Analysis of mispricing and overvaluation
RAD RD
Treatment means
PK 0.182 =0.028
NPK 0.299 0.078
WAIT 0.331 =0.044
BASE 0.375 =0.096
Permutation test p-values (one-sided)
H1: WAIT vs. BASE 0.352 0.618
H2: PK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.027 ** 0.629
H3: NPK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.272 0.858
H4: PK vs. NPK 0.063 * 0.135
Note: The top panel of this table reports the treatment means of RAD (mispricing) and RD (overvaluation)
for the six markets in each of our four treatments. The bottom panel reports exact one-sided p-values
for Fisher-Pitman independent samples permutation tests (Kaiser 2007) comparing these measures across
treatments and groups of treatments as per our four hypotheses. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05.
unequal variances), we obtain precisely the same signiﬁcance pattern of results as that shown in
Table 2, conﬁrming that our results are robust to the choice of test.
Result 1: Mispricing is not signiﬁcantly lower under WAIT compared to BASE. Hy-
pothesis 1 is not supported.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the possibility that simply allowing subjects in WAIT more time to
think might itself have the eﬀect of reducing mispricing. However, we clearly cannot reject the null
hypothesis that RAD is at least as great under WAIT as under BASE (p = 0.352). We can thus
pool the data from WAIT and BASE in our tests of hypotheses 2 and 3; however as we show below,
our results do not depend upon doing so.17
Result 2: Mispricing is signiﬁcantly lower under PK compared to WAIT and BASE.
Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Our second hypothesis states that we expect to replicate the ﬁnding of previous studies which
show that when all subjects are trained to understand the FV process, and this is public knowledge,
17The two-sided p-values for the null hypotheses of equality of WAIT and BASE are 0.703 (RAD) and 0.766 (RD).
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mispricing is less than when training is absent. We indeed ﬁnd that RAD is signiﬁcantly lower under
PK than under WAIT and BASE pooled (p = 0.027). If we instead compare PK to either WAIT
or BASE individually rather than pooled, then we obtain one-sided p-values of 0.062 and 0.044
respectively (see Appendix Table C2). These results conﬁrm that our training protocol produces
results that are comparable to those of other recent studies.
Result 3: Mispricing is not signiﬁcantly lower under NPK compared to WAIT and
BASE. Hypothesis 3 is not supported.
Having established that training has a signiﬁcant eﬀect when it is public knowledge, our next hy-
pothesis concerns whether the eﬀect is still observed when all subjects in the market are trained, but
this is not public knowledge. This is what we would expect if the eﬀect of training operated directly
through reducing subjects' confusion, rather than indirectly through facilitating the coordination
of expectations. As it turns out, while the mean observed level of mispricing is smaller in NPK, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that RAD is at least as great under NPK as under WAIT and
BASE pooled (p = 0.272). If we compare NPK to WAIT or BASE individually, we obtain one-sided
p-values of 0.365 and 0.235 respectively. Thus when training is not public knowledge, we do not
ﬁnd signiﬁcantly less mispricing than in markets in which training is absent.
As noted by one of the referees, one factor that may contribute to the lack of support for Hypothesis
3 is that the observed level of mispricing in our BASE markets (mean RAD of 0.375 in a sample of
n = 6 markets) is toward the low end of the reported literature. Thus Stöckl, Huber, and Kirchler
(2010) report a mean RAD of 0.599 in n = 4 markets, while Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012)
and Huber and Kirchler (2012) both report a mean RAD of 0.414 in what appears to be the same
sample of n = 6 baseline SSW markets. On the other hand, Cheung and Coleman (2012) report a
mean RAD of 0.377 in their n = 6 inexperienced baseline markets, which is very similar to the value
we report here. Although we have no explanation for why we obtain a comparatively low value, we
acknowledge that had our BASE markets been more typical of the reported literature, it is likely we
might have found stronger support for Hypothesis 3. More generally, since non-rejection of the null
hypothesis does not imply that the alternative is false, we do not interpret Result 3 to indicate that
there is no direct eﬀect of training  only that any such eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant in our
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sample. Indeed, as the same referee also observes, the mean RAD of 0.299 in our NPK treatment
is mild relative to the baseline values cited above, and this may itself be interpreted as anecdotal
evidence in support of a direct eﬀect of training.
Result 4: Mispricing is marginally signiﬁcantly lower under PK compared to NPK.
There is mild support for Hypothesis 4.
Our ﬁnal hypothesis concerns the eﬀect of making it public knowledge in treatment PK that all
subjects have been trained to understand the FV process, compared to treatment NPK in which
all subjects have been trained but this is not public knowledge. Note that the signiﬁcance of this
comparison is inhibited by the limited number of observations, and the presence of considerable
within-treatment heterogeneity in NPK in particular. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that RAD is marginally
signiﬁcantly lower under PK than under NPK (p = 0.063).
As noted in footnote 13, our main analyses of the RAD and RD measures in Table 2 excludes
the data from a seventh PK market in which we experienced a fatal server crash after the twelfth
period. Using the available data from this market, we can compute a twelve-period RAD measure
of 0.127, and RD of =0.053. If we include this observation in the test of Hypothesis 4, the diﬀerence
in RAD between NPK and PK increases in signiﬁcance to p = 0.041. Alternatively, when we use
the crashed market to replace the PK market with the lowest observed RAD value, thereby keeping
the number of observations in the test unchanged, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between NPK and PK
remains marginally signiﬁcant with p = 0.071. Thus although our main result is only marginally
signiﬁcant, we interpret these sensitivity analyses to give increased conﬁdence that it is robust.
3 Conclusion
We interpret our results to indicate that, in addition to its direct eﬀect in reducing confusion, much
of the eﬀect of training may also require that it be known to the market that confusion has indeed
been reduced. It appears that when it is public knowledge that everyone has undergone training,
subjects may perceive less uncertainty over the behavior of others and  since they may be less
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inclined to doubt the rationality of others  less opportunity for speculation. In short, the eﬀect of
making training public knowledge may be to facilitate the coordination of expectations on FV as
the equilibrium price path. This indirect eﬀect of training cannot operate in the absence of public
knowledge, even when all subjects in fact have a correct understanding of FV.
Our interpretation is consistent with SSW's original conjecture that mispricing could occur even
when all traders were sophisticated, if that fact was not common knowledge. Indeed, we believe that
our NPK treatment represents a reasonable approximation to the conditions that SSW originally
postulated. These conditions did not hold in SSW's original experiments because of the very real
possibility of confusion, as ﬁrst demonstrated by LNP. In our NPK treatment, while training can
address confusion at an individual level, the common knowledge of rationality is nonetheless rendered
impossible. Under these conditions, we continue to observe discernible mispricing.
We note that our interpretation aligns with the conclusion of a recent study by Xiong and Yu
(2011), who examine the sources of a bubble in Chinese put warrants in the period 20052008.
They take advantage of the ﬁnite life of these warrants to derive an upper bound on FV using a
form of backward induction logic. Their preferred explanation for this bubble combines constraints
on short sales (also present in standard SSWmarkets) with heterogeneous beliefs, and they explicitly
interpret their data in terms of SSW's hypothesis of the non-common knowledge of rationality.
Our results are also consistent with the few other experimental studies we are aware of that credibly
manipulate subjects' expectations regarding the rational play of their counterparts. Thus, Fehr and
Tyran (2001) ﬁnd that subjects exhibit substantially more pronounced money illusion when playing
a price-setting game with other humans than with computerized agents who they know to have
been pre-programmed to play optimally. They interpret this to show that the greater part of
money illusion operates indirectly through strategic uncertainty over the behavior of others, which
is absent in the computerized condition. Likewise, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) study the play
of student subjects and chess players in a laboratory centipede experiment. They ﬁnd that students
in the role of the ﬁrst mover are ten times more likely to stop the game at the ﬁrst decision node
(as predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium) when playing a chess player as opposed to another
student. Conversely, chess players are less likely to stop the game when their opponent is a student as
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compared to another chess player. They interpret these results to indicate that players' assessment
of the rationality of opponents is critical in determining whether subgame-perfect play emerges.
In summary, we oﬀer a richer account of the role of confusion  and the eﬀects of training subjects
to reduce it  in understanding mispricing in SSW markets. We submit that by not only training
subjects to understand declining FV, but also making this public knowledge, recent studies may have
not only resolved the problem of confusion, but also the problem of coordinating expectations. We
provide a new experimental design that makes it possible to disentangle the eﬀect of training per
se from that of its public knowledge, and report evidence to indicate that public knowledge has a
distinct eﬀect over and above that of training alone.
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Appendices
A Experiment parameters
Table A1: Endowment and exchange rate parameters
Endowment type I II III
Number of traders of this type 3 4 3
Initial stock 2 4 6
Initial cash 1,890 1,170 450
Endowment value (ECU) 2,610
Exchange rate (DKK/ECU) 1/11
Endowment value (DKK) 237.27
Total Stock of Units (TSU) 40
Note: One DKK is approximately equal to 0.20 USD (as of November 2009).
B Additional bubble measures
Table B1: Additional bubble measure deﬁnitions
Measure Deﬁnition
Relative Absolute Deviationa RAD = 1T
∑
t
∣∣P¯t − ft∣∣ / ∣∣f¯ ∣∣
Relative Deviationa RD = 1T
∑
t
(
P¯t − ft
)
/
∣∣f¯ ∣∣
Share Turnoverb ST = (
∑
t qt) /q
Price Amplitudeb PA = max
[(
P¯t − ft
)
/f1
]−min [(P¯t − ft) /f1]
Total Dispersionc TD =
∑
t
∣∣∣P˜t − ft∣∣∣
Average Biasc AB =
∑
t
(
P˜t − ft
)
/T
Note: T = total number of trading periods; P¯t = mean transaction price in period t; P˜t = median transaction
price in period t; ft = fundamental value in period t; f¯ = mean fundamental value over the life of the asset;
qt number of transactions in period t; q = total number of shares outstanding.
a Introduced by Stöckl,
Huber, and Kirchler (2010); b Introduced by King (1991); c Introduced by Haruvy and Noussair (2006).
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Table B2: Additional bubble measure results
Treatment Market RAD RD ST PA TD AB
PK 1 0.059 =0.051 11.43 0.265 68.0 =3.60
2 0.125 =0.060 8.63 0.578 347.5 =9.43
3 0.192 =0.049 5.40 0.731 472.0 =4.33
4 0.386 =0.119 9.83 0.837 1,104.0 =20.40
5 0.101 =0.065 4.78 0.555 342.0 =14.73
6 0.230 0.175 8.33 0.408 664.5 34.03
Mean 0.182 =0.028 8.06 0.562 499.7 =3.08
NPK 1 0.461 0.398 4.20 0.749 1,328.5 78.50
2 0.225 0.043 3.25 0.634 648.5 9.23
3 0.303 0.266 5.25 0.534 832.0 49.07
4 0.149 =0.053 4.13 0.445 389.5 =8.03
5 0.436 =0.097 7.18 1.124 1,322.0 =17.60
6 0.223 =0.086 5.30 0.499 636.0 =18.00
Mean 0.299 0.078 4.88 0.664 859.4 15.53
WAIT 1 0.198 0.128 6.00 0.466 516.0 30.67
2 0.531 =0.484 10.73 0.731 1,559.0 =96.13
3 0.417 =0.270 9.23 0.728 1,213.5 =52.43
4 0.057 =0.013 3.05 0.245 138.0 =1.67
5 0.331 0.063 5.98 0.887 982.5 8.30
6 0.450 0.310 4.25 0.907 1,268.5 54.70
Mean 0.331 =0.044 6.54 0.661 946.3 =9.43
BASE 1 0.320 =0.320 5.50 0.569 892.5 =59.50
2 0.600 0.410 8.58 0.957 1,585.5 78.77
3 0.167 =0.081 3.80 0.630 444.0 =12.53
4 0.266 0.097 9.18 0.627 769.5 18.30
5 0.680 =0.525 14.78 1.082 1,962.0 =100.80
6 0.217 =0.159 8.13 0.530 549.5 =21.03
Mean 0.375 =0.096 8.33 0.733 1,033.8 =16.13
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C Robustness checks
Table C1: Alternative statistical tests
RAD RD
Mann-Whitney p-values (one-sided)
H1: WAIT vs. BASE 0.469 0.650
H2: PK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.033 ** 0.590
H3: NPK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.341 0.753
H4: PK vs. NPK 0.066 * 0.294
t-test (unequal variances) p-values (one-sided)
H1: WAIT vs. BASE 0.351 0.612
H2: PK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.016 ** 0.670
H3: NPK vs. WAIT + BASE 0.243 0.883
H4: PK vs. NPK 0.063 * 0.147
Note: The top panel of this table reports exact one-sided p-values for Mann-Whitney U tests comparing
the measures of of RAD (mispricing) and RD (overvaluation) across treatments and groups of treatments
as per our four hypotheses. We compute these using the mwtest command documented in Kaiser and Lacy
(2009). The bottom panel reports the corresponding one-sided p-values for two-sample t-tests (with unequal
variances). * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05.
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Table C2: Pairwise treatment comparisons
RAD RD
Permutation test p-values (one-sided)
H2: PK vs. WAIT 0.062 * 0.557
H2: PK vs. BASE 0.044 ** 0.686
H3: NPK vs. WAIT 0.365 0.794
H3: NPK vs. BASE 0.235 0.853
Note: This table reports exact one-sided p-values for Fisher-Pitman independent samples permutation tests
(Kaiser 2007) for the measures of of RAD (mispricing) and RD (overvaluation) in pairwise comparisons
between treatments. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05.
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Online Appendix (not for publication): Experiment Instructions
General Instructions
This is an experiment on decision making in a market. The instructions are simple and if you follow
them carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money which will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have a question
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you.
In this experiment, you have the opportunity to buy or sell in a market. The money used in this
market is `Experimental Currency Units' (ECU). All trading will be done in terms of ECU. The
cash payment to you at the end of the experiment will be in Danish kroner. The conversion rate
will be 11 ECU to 1 krone.
You will then be asked to complete a questionnaire, after which you will receive your payment.
The entire experiment will last approximately two-and-a-half hours, including half an hour for
instructions and practice.
How to use the Computerized Market
On the top right of the screen you will see how much time is left in the current trading period. The
items you can buy and sell in the market are called shares. In the center of your screen you will see
the number of shares and the amount of money you currently have.
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The screen can be used to participate in the market in one of four ways.
Making an oﬀer to sell a share, by entering the price at which you would like to sell:
To oﬀer to sell a share, enter the price at which you would like to sell in the box labeled `Enter oﬀer
to sell' on the left of the screen, then click on the button `Submit oﬀer to sell'.
The second column from left will show a list of oﬀers to sell, each submitted by a diﬀerent participant.
The lowest oﬀer-to-sell price will always be on the bottom of the list. Your own oﬀer will appear in
blue. Submitting a new oﬀer will replace your previous one.
Making an oﬀer to buy a share, by entering the price at which you would like to buy:
To oﬀer to buy a share, enter the price at which you would like to buy in the box labeled `Enter
oﬀer to buy' on the right of the screen, then click on the button `Submit oﬀer to buy'.
The second column from right will show a list of oﬀers to buy, each submitted by a diﬀerent
participant. The highest oﬀer-to-buy price will always be on the bottom of the list. Your own oﬀer
will appear in blue. Submitting a new oﬀer will replace your previous one.
Buying a share, by accepting an oﬀer to sell:
You can select an oﬀer to sell in the second column from left by clicking on it. If you click the `Buy'
button at the bottom of this column, you will buy one share at the selected price. However you are
not allowed to buy a share from yourself.
When you accept an oﬀer to sell, it will disappear from the list. If you had also placed an oﬀer to
buy, it will disappear from the oﬀers to buy list because you have just bought a share.
Selling a share, by accepting an oﬀer to buy:
You can select an oﬀer to buy in the second column from right by clicking on it. If you click the
`Sell' button at the bottom of this column, you will sell one share at the selected price. However
you are not allowed to sell a share to yourself.
When you accept an oﬀer to buy, it will disappear from the list. If you had also placed an oﬀer to
sell, it will disappear from the oﬀers to sell list because you have just sold a share.
Transaction prices
When you buy a share your money decreases by the price of the purchase. You can only buy a
share if you have enough money to pay for it.
When you sell a share your money increases by the price of the sale. You can only sell a share if
you owned one to begin with.
In the middle column of the screen, labeled `Transaction prices', you will see the prices at which
shares have traded in the current period.
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Practice period
You now have ten minutes to practice buying and selling shares. Your actions in this practice period
will not inﬂuence your earnings or your position later in the experiment. The only goal is to master
the use of the interface.
Please make sure that you successfully submit oﬀers to buy and oﬀers to sell. Also make sure that
you successfully accept other people's oﬀers to buy and sell shares.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will assist you.
Speciﬁc Instructions for this Experiment [Distributed after completion of practice period.]
In each market there are ten participants. Although there may be more than ten participants in the
lab today, you will always be in the same market of ten participants, consisting of yourself and the
same set of nine others.
The market will consist of ﬁfteen trading periods. In each period there will be four minutes during
which you can trade shares in exchange for ECU.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst trading period, your screen will display your initial holdings of money
and/or shares. These will not necessarily be the same for all participants in the market.
Any trade that you make will change your holdings of money and shares. These holdings will carry
over from one trading period to the next.
Dividends
Recall that the market consists of ﬁfteen trading periods. Shares are assets with a life of ﬁfteen
periods. Each share will pay a dividend to its current owner at the end of each period.
The dividend is randomly determined by the computer, and will be the same for all shares. In
particular, each share that you own at the end of a period will pay:
 a dividend of 0 ECU with probability 1/4;
 a dividend of 8 ECU with probability 1/4;
 a dividend of 28 ECU with probability 1/4; and
 a dividend of 60 ECU with probability 1/4.
Since each outcome is equally likely, the average dividend is (0+8+28+60) / 4 = 24 ECU in every
period.
Dividends will be added to your money balance automatically at the end of each period. After the
dividend is paid at the end of the ﬁfteenth trading period, all shares will be worthless and there will
be no further earnings possible from them.
Average Holding Value Table
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE to help you make decisions.
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The ﬁrst column indicates the Ending Period of the market. The second column indicates the
Current Period for which the average holding value is being calculated. The third column gives the
Number of Holding Periods from the Current Period to the Ending Period.
The fourth column gives the Average Dividend per Period for each share that you hold. The ﬁfth
column gives the Average Holding Value per Share that you hold from the Current Period until the
end of the market.
That is, for each share that you hold for the remainder of the market, you will earn on average the
amount listed in column ﬁve. The value in column ﬁve is calculated by multiplying the values in
columns three and four.
AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE
Ending Current Number of
Ö
Average Dividend
=
Average Holding
Period Period Holding Periods Per Period Value Per Share
15 1 15 24 360
15 2 14 24 336
15 3 13 24 312
15 4 12 24 288
15 5 11 24 264
15 6 10 24 240
15 7 9 24 216
15 8 8 24 192
15 9 7 24 168
15 10 6 24 144
15 11 5 24 120
15 12 4 24 96
15 13 3 24 72
15 14 2 24 48
15 15 1 24 24
Your Earnings
At the end of the market, your earnings will equal the amount of money you have at the end of
period ﬁfteen, after the last dividend has been paid.
This amount of money will be equal to:
Any money you had at the beginning of period one
+ Any money you received from sales of shares
= Any money you spent on purchases of shares
+ Any dividends you received
At the conclusion of the experiment this amount will be converted into Danish kroner at the rate
speciﬁed on page one of these instructions, and paid to you in cash.
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